The fact remains, however, that member states have still distinct energy markets with few interconnections and engage in hardly any trade at all, for instance, in electricity and natural gas. The Commission regards the creation of a free market in power and gas as one of the Most important elements in creating a single market for goods and services.
Many energy companies have however stubbornly resisted attempts to open up the market. The factors determining the security of supply and availability of energy differ markedly. The price differentials for the various energy sources are often high for both private and industrial consumers with competition obviously being distorted as a result. There are also more and more cases of specific energy actions or proposals dependent on the pursuit of other policy objectives.
Examples of this include environmental policy the fight against pollution and the greenhouse effect , support for crisis-ridden sectors such as coal or farming and tax regulations Efforts are being made by the Commission to foster intra-EU gas and electricity trade. Norway and Algeria. Even so, these will be some requirement for new sources, but the financial resources needed to bring in such distant gas and oil to consumer areas are gigantic in comparison with the present financial capacities of the various partners.
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This shortcoming could be one of the major limitations on the EU economies unless coordinated solutions are sought and found for mobilizing capital and creating more flexible credit terms. Such co-operation, based on a fairer sharing out of risks and earnings, would provide continuity of interest throughout oil and gas industries, from production site to consumer areas, and would help to ensure a better guarantee of secure markets for producers and secure supplies for consumers.
The European Commission White paper and the Brussels European Council December , the work of the Christophersen Group in the first half of and the decisions of the Corfu European Council June have successfully enabled the revival of projects concerning energy network. Moreover, the consumption of oil and gas in the NIS, too, already large, will continue to increase. Therefore, in the longer-term, Europe will have a vested interest in seeing the full exploitation of the large NIS reserves.
The transport of gas over long distances will be profitable only if it is effected in large volumes and at a continuous rate. The cost of transportation from the Siberian fields to Western Europe approx. This is about the same as the price currently being paid by Western Europe. There are proposals for a new EU energy policy up to the year 12 , which, if favorably received by the member states, could lead to the inclusion of energy policy measures within the Treaty on European Union when it will be revised in Energy policy was deliberately omitted from the Maastricht Treaty with member states jealous of their national control deciding that it was an area best loft to individual countries.
And, on this score, the European Energy Charter Treaty though it is no longer a "European" affair in its geographic coverage deserves a special mention. It was first proposed in by the Dutch Government and is known as the Lubbers Plan with the aim of ensuring that the energy resources indigenous to the West, which will not last forever, be supplemented by those of Eastern Europe and the NIS. The fundamental purpose of the Charter is defined as opening up the energy resources of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, encouraging investment and free trade, and ensuring reciprocal access to markets, as well as supporting transition towards democracy and market economy.
The Treaty negotiated under the European Energy Charter is destined to become a cornerstone of the future Western energy policy. Just as the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community alter the Second World War become the symbol and the instrument of the ideal of no more war particularly between France and Germany , the creation now of an energy union for the whole of Europe but also for Such important non-European partners as the US, Japan, Canada and Australia is likely to make an important contribution towards preventing new walls from dividing the old continent in the future.
A union of this kind could also serve another general political aim - that of preventing Europe from becoming too heavily dependent on other parts of the world for its energy. More importantly, the Energy Treaty may also serve as a useful framework within which the controversial pipeline projects could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Since the signing of the Charter, the participating countries negotiated the Charter's Basic Agreement now "Charter Treaty" with a view to providing the legal basis for energy industries' operations and investment in all signatory countries.
The energy sector was chosen for such an ambitious project because this sector offered the best prospects fur speedy and tangible economic returns for both sides. There are, however, still some fundamental technical difficulties to be resolved. Also, the nature of the negotiations in progress dues not make things any easier and, above all, the large number of participants slows things clown. The involvement of the non-European OF-CD countries all too often transforms the discussions into a negotiation solely between the Western countries Last but not least, the economic and political instability of the former Soviet Union makes certain negotiators exceedingly cautious.
The EU scaled clown its initial ambitions because the main beneficiaries of the Treaty, the former Soviet republics, were not in a position to open up its market completely to the exploration of, and drilling for, oil and natural gas. The new compromise envisages that the provisions on pre-investment protection will not be included in the phase I Treaty Signatories will negotiate during a three-year period beginning January the conditions under which the principle of national treatment to the pre-investment phase will apply and which exceptions to the principle are to be allowed.
As a result of these negotiations, the number of exceptions included in their legislation and considered to be necessary at the time, if any, should be reduced to a minimum Russia decided to sign the Treaty alter last-minute consultations about trade in nuclear materials and repatriation of investments from Russia. The US raised a number of objections to the Treaty, which centered on how far the US federal government can go in committing individual States to treaties which it bas signed.
The US wanted the Treaty text to specify chat the federal government would 'recommend' the Treaty to individual States but not 'oblige' them to apply it. However, it became clear during the Treaty negotiations that all the other participating countries with federal structures - notably Russia, Canada, Australia and Switzerland - would demand the same privilege.
According to Energy Charter Conference Chairman Charles Rutten, there would then be no guarantees that the Treaty would be applied, leaving foreign investors with no certainty whatsoever The Treaty, signed by forty-six nations in Lisbon on 18 December and expected to be ratified by the end of , will likely bring about the following spin-off advantages for the West :. Although there is some risk attached to reliance on NIS energy in the event of high West-NIS tension or of internal disorder or collapse, supplies would be cut off , this danger should not be overstated; the NIS have up to now been a reliable supplier of energy to the West, and are likely to continue to be so if only because they need the hard currency for an al]-out economic reconstruction.
All the evidences demonstrate that real progress towards efficiencies in the NIS and Eastern Europe could quite significantly reduce world greenhouse gas emissions in the medium term. This would work in three ways. More energy would be produced thanks to the introduction of Western technology, Energy efficiency measures would lead to a reduction in domestic energy demand, releasing more for export. In the long term the West could come to depend critically on the NIS's enormous supplies. The following benefits might be identified from the NIS point of view:. The energy sector will play a crucial role in the economic restructuring of three countries and the Energy Charter Treaty will provide the framework for energy co-operation.
The expansion of hard currency outlets for NIS energy production, combined with more active involvement of Western companies and technology in exploration and exploitation, should increase the pressure for a more sensible price structure, greater independence for operators and better incentives for productivity and efficiency. And a restructuring of the energy sector, which of course plays a rote in most NIS economies, is bound to increase the pressure for a more general economic restructuring along the same lines. The Kazakh President, Mr.
Nazarbayev, during his official visit to London, made this point quite clear when he said : " I do not think that in today's world weapons can do anything to protect a country. Our main security guarantee against Russia will be a powerful Western business presence in Kazakhstan. Since , when mmt of oil produced, three bas been a downward trend in oil production To date, gas demand bas not registered the rapid drop that bas been experienced by other fuels, primarily because gas supply bas not had the same difficulties as oil. Old style subsidies to economy in general and to energy industry in particular were reduced or eliminated in all the republics.
Even as production has dropped steadily, exports have grown. In the first 11 months of , shipments outside the former Soviet territory totalled Natural gas production is estimated to total Geologists expect more fields to be discovered and think that they will have to revise reserves estimates upwards as the results from ongoing or planned exploration programs start coming in. Of the former Soviet republics, only two others besides Russia - namely, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan -produce enough crude oil to supply their own refineries and only three Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan produce more crude oil than their internal consumption of refined products.
But even Kazakhstan, the second largest oil producer among the republics, relied heavily upon Russia for its own oil supply. Most of the crude run through its refineries was brought in from Russia Western Siberia , while most of its crude production was shipped out of the republic to be refined in Russia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.
Furthermore, its own refinery output is not large enough to supply the republic's own requirements for refined products, necessitating large imports of refined products from the surrounding republics, mainly Russia. Turkmenistan has 25 producing fields, with must of the country's current gas output located in three regions : the Kopet Dag though along the border with Iran; onshore and offshore along the Caspian Sea; and along the Amu Darya River. Having an estimated 2. Kazakhstan's oil reserves are estimated at 16 billion barrels.
The crude oil distribution system in the former USSR was highly integrated and centrally directed as in other sectors. For example, there exist no transfer facilities, such as measuring devices or tank farms, at the border crossings. One result of this is that data on inter-republic oil flows are quite limited and unreliable Domestic consumption is expected to follow a similar pattern, allowing exports from the NIS to remain at approximately their current level of 2.
The fact that Russian exports to destinations outside the republics and other former East Bloc nations rose more sharply than expected in exacerbated a glutted oil market and contributed to the drop in the world oil prices. NIS natural gas consumption is also expected to continue expanding and gas exports to Western and Eastern Europe are forecast to grow over the period to Given the expected rise in gas demand in Western Europe, the NIS are likely to be more important as gas producers to Europe than as oil producers.
In fart, gas exports may become as important as oil exports for the NIS in terms of foreign currency earnings. Production in non-Russian republics, primarily Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, is likely to rise faster than Russian output between and , reaching 1. It might be useful to highlight the basic features of the current energy situation in the Eurasian economies, borrowing from various IEA assessments:. The moves towards political independence from Russia by the Eurasian republics have had to be paid for at a high economic price.
New trade and payment barriers have deprived the region of the full benefit of comparative trade advantages of each republic. Under these circumstances, the integrated system of oil and gas pipelines, as well as the electric power system, suffered disruptions and higher operational and capital costs. In awareness of these dangers, energy officials from Russia and the other republics tried to maintain as much co-operation as possible. All the former Soviet republics, with the exception of Turkmenistan, Latvia and Estonia, have applied for membership.
In March top officials from the 12 republics formed a new "Inter-Governmental Council for Oil and Gas" in the Siberian town of Surgut with the aim of improving cooperation in oil and gas production, transport, pricing and investment.
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The Surgut conference, although it failed to resolve all contentious issues, at least appeared to recognize the high degree of interdependence that exists between the republics. However, critical questions on prices and transit rights still remain to be resolved. Increasingly, economic relations among the former Soviet republics continue to be dominated by issues surrounding the supply of fuels and electricity particularly given the trend towards liberalized energy prises internally, as well as the prospect that energy imports will be settled in convertible currency.
Economic interdependence among the republics, particularly in the energy sector, proved to be a key element in the desire of many republics for some type of cohesion in the post-Soviet period, reflected in the formation of the CIS. The possible break-up of the CIS structure will disrupt entire energy system, including the flow of crude oil and gas over the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Taking advantage of its relatively strong position, Russia wants to retain its final say over all CIS energy issues, holding in its hand a Sword of Damocles over the heads of other republics - an attitude, which give rise to fears of the possible revival of Russian imperialism in the region. The dispute between Russia and the Ukraine is particularly illustrative in this respect.
Kazakhstan bas recently been subjected to strong political and economic pressure from Russia, which has demanded an equity share in Kazakhstan's giant Karachaganak natural gas field and is also laid to be seeking a stake in the rich Tenghiz oilfield The latest attempt by Russia to prevent Western companies from investing in Azerbaijan oil industry was detailed in an 28 April letter from its Foreign Ministry in which it demanded the right to reject Caspian Sea oil projects that its former Soviet neighbors are negotiating.
It appears that the Eurasian states are coming to a point, where the avoidance of such a mutually harmful confrontation in the field of energy may not be easy. Both rides recognize that the oil sector is the most urgent area for foreign co-operation and investment. However, in the absence of a sound legal basis for such undertakings, foreign involvement did not go beyond relatively small pilot projects and feasibility studies.
Joint ventures in oil production produced 5 mort in and were expected to rise to 10 mort in The World Bank reports, in a new study 27 , a "radical shift in the pattern of external financing flows to developing countries in the early s, from debt to equity financing and from bank to non-bank sources. Commercial bank loans have been replaced by bond and equity portfolio flows and greater foreign direct investment". Meanwhile, the major oil companies will continue to be largely self-financing.
Despite self-financing and the shift away from debt financing, the view that financing is the new bottleneck in energy projects has many followers. In short, the world is resource rich, but capital short. Oil producers will therefore increasingly have to seek non-traditional sources of finance. Many oil and gas projects are competing with one another for a limited international money pool. In the final analysis, money will no doubt flow to the most profitable and safe energy investments.
Since the over-intensive development policies pursued by the central government created severe environmental problems in all the Eurasian republics and unbearable strains were placed on the fragile ecological balance of the region, which led to various forms of dysfunction, environment-related investment financing is also becoming important. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, visited Central Asia's major capitals several times, trying to finalize agreements for exporting oil, gas and other commodities through Iranian ports.
Iran's Finance Minister, Mr. Iran, exploiting its geography advantages, drags its feet in allowing Turkish trucks to cross its territory on their way to Central Asia, and gives mixed signals on whether it will ever agree to accommodate an Azerbaijan-Turkey pipeline 29 - even if the Western basically the US objection will be overcome to a cross-Iran route. Iran is being portrayed as a country-weight to Ankara's growing influence in the region, while Ankara feels it necessary to underline that it is not in competition for regional primacy with any country.
However, there are recent assertions that, in the face of an increasingly hostile Russia, starting to flex its still considerable muscles in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey and Iran may be burying their differences and a convergence of strategic interests is emerging. A there-day official visit by the Iranian Vice-President, Mr. Hasan Hahihi, in December , resulted in a series of agreements 30 : agreement was reached in principle on a tripartite meeting between Iran, Turkmenistan and Turkey about transporting natural gas to Europe via Turkey; the extension of the Trans-European Motorway network as far as Iran; the lifting of obstructions facing Turkish trucks carrying goods to Central Asia via Iran; and building a railway service between Lake Van and Iran and Central Asia.
Early it held a summit conference of the Caspian Sea leaders, which led to the announcement of a Caspian trade grouping, incorporating all the riparian states. Aware of the importance of energy in the region, Iran moved fast to conclude energy deals with most of the former Soviet states early in , including separate initial agreements with the Ukraine and Turkmenistan to build pipelines in order to export Iranian and Turkmen gas to Europe.
As part of its overall strategy, Iran also agreed in April to supply four to five million tones of crude oil and 25 bcm of gas each year to the Ukraine. Azerbaijan, too, wants to buy three to four bcm of gas a year from Iran to offset ruts from Turkmenistan. Observers indicate that if Iran succeeds in its bid to act as a doorway to the republics, it stands to gain significant revenues from goods passing through its territory. Iran agreed to fund energy projects in the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan as part of this agreement with Baku.
Iran is also to fund an oil pipeline construction project there 32 , build a refinery with an annual capacity of Iranian strategists are well cognizant of the fact that whoever provides a transit route will have greater influence over the course of events in that region. Iran is reportedly campaigning for the establishment of an international organization of producers and exporters of natural gas along lines of the OPEC.
The creation of an alliance led by Iran of oil producing countries from the Caspian Sea region is also under consideration. The Japanese National Oil Corporation announced that it would launch a feasibility study for the commercial production of oil and natural gas in the Central Asian republics. Japan is also considering how to cope with the problem of transporting natural gas and oil from Central Asia to Japan. One plan would be to export oil and natural gas to other former Soviet republics or European countries and then swap them for oil and gas produced closer to Japan, as in Southeast Asia.
Japan's first attempts to explore its interest in the region dates bock to May , when the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Michio Watanabe, visited the region. On a follow-up mission, a high-level Finance Ministry delegation toured the region in October Business groups followed suit. Japan's current strategy towards Eurasia dues not seem clearly defined. It is loosely coordinated, with different ministries pursuing separate agendas, though the Foreign Ministry seems to be in the lead.
But Tokyo nonetheless took a series of steps that set the stage for becoming the dominant aid donor to the region. It will now be possible for Tokyo to register its assistance flows to the region as official development aid. Reports indicate that Japan is about to complete its drive to open embassies in all of these republics In articulating a future energy policy, MITI posits that natural gas should be established as the basic of Japanese energy source with a view to cutting its dependency on oil and reducing the emission of harmful gases.
The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Hosokawa, made a proposal during the APEC Seattle meeting in November to the effect that APEC should devise an Action Plan to address the general "tripartite" relationship between the three Es, namely: economic growth, environment and energy security. According to press reports, there are some preliminary thoughts on transporting Central Asian oil and gas, via China, to Japan.
The "Silk Route" energy project chat involves Japan, China and Eurasia is a mixture of energy politics and economics. At the present time, Japan is measuring the maximum benefit the country can secure, by either : i helping Russian Far East oil and gas development; or ii by supporting Turkmenistan gas development along with China's Tarim Basin oil and gas development. In effect, the Silk Route projects lifeline will ultimately depend on Japanese financing. White the decision will be a market-oriented one, political consideration will be fully reflected as well.
A casual reader of Japanese affairs may be forgiven for thinking that it is not only on account of sources of energy that Tokyo is taking a keen interest in the Eurasian world -- strategic concerns to counterbalance two countries, namely Russia and China, through active engagement in the region, as well as cultural affinities all bear a considerable impact upon the current Japanese approach vis-a-vis this part of the globe. Development of the country's energy resources will therefore be an urgent and essential task if the momentum for such an economic drive is to be maintained.
Much has been written in early s about China's emergence as a potential oil power. Comparisons have ranged from those that pictured China as another Middle East with a Middle East-like impact on future global oil markets, to more modest images of an oil-producing country that can meet its rapidly expanding domestic needs through the s and still have some oil for export to its neighbors, particularly Japan. Yet, to fulfil even the latter prediction, China will have to surmount a series of substantial political, financial and technical obstacles China is today under increasing pressure to make significant new oil discoveries if it is to avoid, in such a high growth period, becoming a net crude oil importer in the nidx, or perhaps even before.
Its proven reserves at the end of stood at 3. However, estimates of proven and potential reserves vary, but mort China experts believe the country has a maximum of 5. In , China's oil production reached an estimated mmt. Customs figures show that China exported So the opportunity should be taken with oil prices currently at their five-year low to import a large quantity of crude and develop its petrochemical industry. In the longer term beyond the year , the future of China's oil industries lies in the north-west regions adjacent to the borders of the Eurasian republics.
Recent exploration for oil in the Tarim Basin in the far western Muslim-populated Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous region yielded significant finds. One of them, the Tazhong, in which oil was found in , is the largest in China, covering an area of 12 mn acres. Recognizing the fart that foreign investment and technology will be necessary in order to achieve their economic aims and to make China self supporting in oil, the Chinese government adopted a more open policy and international bidding was already opened for the there massive prospects in the west, mainly the Junggar, Turpan and Tarim basins.
The first round of bidding attracted 68 foreign firms from 17 countries. These regions together produced 8. Chinese geologists estimated that the geological reserves of the Basin could be as much as 74 bn barrels of oil and 7. There are also rumors that China saved the hest blocks on the Tarim Basin for itself, offering only the less promising ones to western companies. As already mentioned, there exists a Japanese proposal to run a pipeline all the way through the Kazakhstan border to the eastern seaboard of China, which would be 6.
Its feasibility is still under consideration. There is evidence that this could be of interest to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, both seeking alternative routes to their gas exports. China bas the potential to swallow a large portion of gas and oil from Eurasia.
Transporting the Tarim oil and gas on a Eurasian pipeline to the international markets is also under serious consideration. Given this situation and its known geo-strategic interests in Eurasia, it would not be an exaggeration if one argued that China, a major player in the region, will continue to take an increasingly strong interest in the Eurasian energy prospects and do the best it can to shape the course of events there.
In the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan all visited Beijing one alter another and, in return, the Chinese Premier, Mr. Li Peng, toured all the Central Asian capitals in April to intensify co-operation with their "new" neighbors. In his speeches he regularly affirmed China's interest in stability and security in the region. To respond to China's security concerns, President Nazarbayev explicitly committed himself to preventing advocates of an "East Turkestan Republic" from working against China and interfering in Xinjiang from the territory of Kazakhstan But, in some cases, success may depend on a far-sighted strategic alliance.
This brings us to Turkey, a country that is not only situated at the crossroads of Europe, Western Asia, the Middle East the Caucasus and North Africa, but is also at the junctions of various new currents and different civilizations. From Brussels, Turkey is still a newly industrializing country with many Domestic problems, well behind the economic and political development of the EU; but seen from Tashkent or Baku, it is a dynamic regional power. Turkey's presence in Eurasia has been strongly felt since the demise of the Soviet Empire in many areas including the energy sector.
This will be met largely by a rapid increase in imports of natural gas, and an ambitious power station construction program. Turkey's heavy dependence on oil imports will increase radically by Domestic crude output of 4. On the basin of current known reserves, it will dwindle to , tones in most rapidly between and , sufficient only to meet 0.
Domestic production is likely to deteriorate in the shorter term because of the increase in separatist terrorist activities in the southeastern region of the country. In , oil provided In , the country imported, according to preliminary figures, some Demand for imported natural gas is projected to increase from around 4. Deliveries already lined up from Russia, Qatar and Algeria; more could follow if new transit lines from Turkmenistan were established. Thus, a reduced share for oil is anticipated in total energy consumption. Fuel oil is giving way to gas and will increasingly lose market share as new hydro-electric and coal-fired power plants come into use.
To meet the growing energy demand, the government has mapped out an ambitious power station construction program up to , comprising 47 thermal stations, hydro-electric plants and two nuclear power station. In particular, the country is increasingly perceived as a jumping-off point for investment and trade activities in the Eurasian republics, many of which offer promising oil and gas prospects as highlighted earlier. Communications with these countries are relatively good and the Turkish government has made efforts to cement economic as well as political ties with these republics.
Turks already signed various energy accords with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. For centuries, Turkey has been a hub between Europe and Asia and today she wants to serve as a trans-continental bridge. When it was just a question of providing an oil outlet for Iraq, there was no problem; then, Iran entered the scene, with the idea of sending gas through Turkey into Europe - a situation which calls for as delicate a piece of diplomatic manoeuvering as anything dreamed up at the height of the Byzantine Empire. The Turkish contribution has therefore become an important part of any plan for transporting the Eurasian oil and gas to Europe.
The United States has notified several governments in the region that it would endorse construction of a pipeline through Turkey to carry future oil production from the Caspian region. A similar situation may arise as regards the Middle Eastern gas, too, when the Arab-lsraeli peace prevails eventually in the region. Efforts to find new alternative export routes for crude oil from the Eurasian republics that would avoid Russia now appear to be in abeyance. The current network of oil and natural gas pipelines that serves the former Soviet Union is immense.
The Soviet Union had built up an integrated gas supply network stretching over a distance of some The bulk of the system was laid during the last two decades, but pipelines are falling to survive anywhere near as long as their target year lifespan. In Russia alone, 6. The single mort important reason for this widespread decay is that the Soviets laid pipelines without corrosion protection So, for the West, the construction of new gas pipelines from Eurasia seems to be one of the priority issues. The continued closure of the Adria pipeline, which has not been operational since September as a result of war in former Yugoslavia, thwarted the initial efforts of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to buy oil from other sources.
Poland is having the greatest success diversifying supply routes, including shipping Iranian crude via Gdansk to its inland Plock refinery, which used to rely solely on Soviet crude deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline. Poland has gone from near total dependence on Russian oil in to a situation, where it is now purchasing nearly two-thirds of its import needs from other suppliers.
In terms of gas trade, Eastern Europe still does not have any sources of supply other than the former Soviet Union. Since the bulk of the region's oil and gas originates from the Russian fields, the main web pipelines is concentrated on Russian territory. Even the more recent additions system often require immediate repair, as they have been built too quickly and without necessary insulation. Accidents to pipelines are frequent, causing damage to the environment and disruption to the economic activities. Several banks, including the EBRD, the World Bank and investment banks such as JP Morgan and Japan's Daiwa showed interest in participating in the rehabilitation and expansion of the Russian natural gas transmission network.
Huge amounts of capital will be needed to finance the construction of new export lines planned for Western Siberia and the Russian Far East; but finding foreign investors and lenders for oil pipelines will probably be very difficult, as long as confusion continues about the ownership of oil resources and the most economical and politically stable route. Republics with fewer energy resources are also. To a large extent they are not only planned in anticipation of higher export demand, but basically as alternative routes avoiding certain transit countries which could potentially create political problems.
To find foreign funds for new oil pipelines is difficult. Given the size and flexibility of the world oil market, long-term supply security considerations are hard to sell to Western oil buyers. Funds can only come from foreign companies having a considerable share in local production. As long as these shares are as small as they are because of the legal and political risks perceived, foreign involvement in oil pipelines is bound to be insignificant as well.
The international oil and gas industry is already acutely aware that companies involved in major projects need to ensure a way out of the former Soviet Union for their oil and gas production to be viable. Oil output from Chevron Corp. However, negotiating to invest billions of dollars in new pipelines also is difficult in a region fraught with political uncertainty. Western oil companies have sometimes found themselves competing with domestic companies, who either seek control of transport facilities or oppose them Moreover, Western companies have found that they have been expected to make most of the investment in return for a less-than-proportional stake in the facilities as in the Chevron vs Caspian Pipeline Consortium case.
The Eurasian states have a great deal in common with Turkey Some share a common religion. They also share much of the same linguistic and ethnic heritage. Initially, high expectations were raised in the public that contacts between Turkey and the Eurasians would boom all of a sudden since the people of these republics were mostly of Turkic origin, speak a language similar to Turkish and had a common heritage of Islamic tradition.
As time passed by, it became evident that these common values could not be the only factors in bolstering Turkey's political and economic ties with them.
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This does not of course mean that Turkey is not in a more advantageous position than many other countries. Turkey has encountered serious geographical problems as it has tried to develop relations with Eurasia. These have principally related to issues of access.
Turkey has tried to neutralize this disadvantage of geography by seeking to develop non-terrestrial communications, putting emphasis on the development of a modern telecommunications network, and encouraging air transport routes. The prevailing view is that Ankara's role as a regional power can be enhanced only if Turkey properly assesses existing realities and predict future developments, refraining from mistakes that an over-emotional approach would causes The Turkmen President, Mr. Saparmurad Niyazov, confirmed this accord in Davos and in Ankara last year.
At a time when Turkey's natural gas needs are expected to hit 20 bcm by the year with its production at mcm, it is hardly surprising that Ankara bas intensified its negotiations with Russia 52 , its traditional supplier of natural gas, and has brought in new partners - namely, Georgia, Qatar and Turkmenistan for fresh supplies. Gas plans for Turkmenistan to Europe via Iran and Turkey are now on the back burner, just like the Azerbaijan pipeline deal, until the war in the former Yugoslavia is resolved to the satisfaction of all the parties.
Representatives from Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Turkey came together in Ankara in January to solve the problem of financing the project. Aware of Western reservations about Iran, Turkey has proposed that it could take as the responsability of bringing the pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey via Iran. The third chapter, dealing with the necessary changes in European politics, is introduced by Artis Pabriks, co-editor of the collection of articles, who calls the EU to pursue a certain and pro-active policy in protection of its values.
Andis Kudors, Riga, April Some may argue it has been one of the most cited and discussed EU documents, even outliving some EU Treaties. If so, the EU has been an isle of prosperity and security in an ocean of global economic turbulence for more than a decade. In his address Lavrov played a blame-game accusing the US and EU of applying zero-sum tactics and making Eastern Partnership countries choose sides between West and East ; confronting Russia when abandoning the EU strategic partnership and NATO-Russia Council; and of continuously taking steps towards escalation when managing the Ukraine crisis.
The answer is: they are either deceptive, or no longer reflect the reality of global power parities. Likewise, Lord Ismay today is as correct as he was half a century ago. Due to the new leadership and changed geopolitical context, the event could be a pivotal moment for the EU. Member states will have to decide whether they are willing to surrender part of their sovereignty and reach the next level of integration in defence and security, or whether European dependence on US protection will increase while the EU global role diminishes.
Therefore, to provide context for the Ukraine crisis, the article approaches several questions at once, such as: What challenges currently and may eventually endanger the EU now and in due future? How do the major EU players perform in foreign and security policy? And finally, why should the EU review its Security Strategy? In the European Security Strategy ESS for the first time in EU history defined global challenges and key threats that nations should strive to overcome and mitigate together.
The definition of global challenges included elements such as conflict-caused migration flows, pandemics, shortage of some resources water , and the race for others gas To temper or eradicate any risks that could spill over to the EU, the ESS was based on a concept of the development-security nexus anticipating actions to improve development conditions in the European neighbourhood.
Along with the global challenges, the ESS identified five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. However, recently that has all changed. In comparison to the reports following the global economic recession of dominated by concerns over economic conditions, climate change, or cyber security, the edition was different. It clearly proved that geopolitical risks in terms of their likelihood are back on a global agenda.
It highlighted the extent of political and psychological effects the Ukraine crisis left in According to the prominent team of 18 people, which includes two former NATO Secretary-Generals, a Latvian ex-President, retired army generals, MEPs, and recognized academics, Europe currently faces three major challenges: an arch of instability in its neighbourhood; military capabilities that are weakened by austerity and unreasoned duplication; and a political and economic gravity centre that has drifted from Europe to Asia.
First, there are risks eroding European stability and prosperity from within the EU. While still experiencing low growth rates, Europe struggles with problems of social, economic, and political fragmentations. For example, in youth unemployment in some EU member states peaked to nearly 60 percent16 while differences between the minimum monthly wage in Eastern and Western nations were tenfold.
In September , at least people from Britain from France, from Belgium, 80 from Sweden, and 70 from Denmark had officially left Europe to join the ranks of jihadi warriors. And will Britain choose to stay in the EU? Today, internal and external security aspects are interlinked and mutually dependent; therefore responses to multi-faceted challenges have to be adequately complex. From the South, it faces instability, civil wars, and uncontrolled migration from conflict-torn Syria through to Libya. At any time a crisis from such distant locations as Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Middle East can quickly spill over to the immediate neighbourhood, or the EU itself.
In parallel, Europe still has Likewise, the EU should look truth in the eyes and start investing in peaceful and diplomatic solutions for the unresolved conflict between Cyprus and Turkey that has hampered any fully fledged EU—NATO cooperation for more than a decade. Finally, there are security risks which do not fall into any of the previous categories. In contrast to the internal and external security challenges, transnational risks and threats may tend to catch their victims by surprise causing huge damage, if protection systems are not resilient enough.
For example, in just the first two months of , terrorists organized violent attacks in the EU capitals of Paris and Copenhagen. Dangerous pandemics Ebola , extreme weather conditions, natural hazards and man-made disasters, cyber-attacks including ones that damage smart grids and critical infrastructure , illicit trafficking, and uncontrolled migration are among the challenges that do and will threaten European citizens in the decade to come. Some of the most pressing global long-term challenges are erosion of the Western-designed international order, European defence budgetary cuts, reduced European global trade and development influence, and a disintegration of European unity.
Moreover, not only do the Chinese Development Bank and Import-Export Bank of China lend more finance and reduce the Western power over reforms in developing countries, China has already gained influence within the World Bank. European Defence Budgetary Cuts The EU has been free riding and not taking defence seriously for too long now, and the economic crisis has made the situation go from poor to worse.
It was merely less than half However, in the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis, due to deep national defence budgetary cuts throughout the EU, the global power parities substantially changed. Ten years after Europe for the first time set its security policy ambitions — the EU spent just Meanwhile, emerging powers China and Russia had caught up closing the gap between the two, and the Western states. By they had increased their defence budgets more than five times when compared with and thereby already accounting for Such a trend was possible due to stable annual defence budgetary allocations of at least two percent of the gross domestic products GDP in China and no less than three percent in Russia.
While in all actors except China slowed down or started to diminish their defence budgets, two years later the tendencies became worrying when regarding the future of the Western global power and The EU defence budget decreased by As a result, in , Russia for the first time since spent a larger share of its GDP 4. If the current trend continues and emerging powers continue to grow while the EU stagnates or lags behind, Europe might lose its military might in less than a decade, and struggle with more worrying problems than an autonomous power projection to distant crisis management operations.
Figure 1. Yet they are also in danger of being lessened. Therefore, trade, development, and security are interlinked and should be treated accordingly whenever discussing and drafting a new panEuropean strategy. First is the chronic energy supply dependency as most Eastern and Central European countries still import most of or all their gas from Russia. Second, Russia directly funds far left and right wing populist parties in nearly half of the EU countries including France, the UK, and Germany , of which many, along with opposing further European integration, favour closer ties with Russia or an exit from the EU.
In late February it even And NATO at the Wales Summit proved the Ukraine crisis brought collective defence back as its quintessence and showed the Alliance is resilient and capable of rapidly adapting to the new geopolitical context. Or how should the EU react and exercise effective crisis management and Should the EU transform itself similarly to the Alliance, and should it become more militarily independent, or should it stay a civilian power? Where was the CSDP after Russian-backed proxy insurgent groups occupied and illegally annexed Crimea and entered the Eastern parts of sovereign Ukraine?
A military CSDP operation was not launched. The truth is that Ukraine is merely another example highlighting much deeper structural and systemic gaps that a possible joint European stance towards foreign and security policy is dependent on. Thirdly, the EU still has no comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy. The ESS is outdated and no more reflects the international balance of power, nor the threats and challenges the EU is facing, or its global role.
The EU needs a shared vision on a cooperation framework for strategically preventing crisis rather than meeting the consequences when they have already evolved. Lastly, the EU has no systematic and tailored If the EU is to succeed in maintaining the security of its own citizens and neighbourhood, it will have to reinvigorate multilateralism in a world where no country has means or power to meet all security challenges on its own. They should be selfsustainable for a period of at least 30 days which can be extended to up days, if resupplied.
However, as it presently stands, the Battle Groups have never been deployed even though there have been plenty of opportunities to do so ranging from Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic, to Syria, and most recently Ukraine. Also, since the Lisbon Treaty provides mechanisms for a more integrated defence. And regarding the debate on EU defence and security, it was only in December that the European Council, for the first time since adopting the Lisbon Treaty, addressed the CSDP and European defence capabilities and market.
The run up to the summit highlighted a major achievement towards greater defence integration, Among others, tasking included development of such military capabilities as drones, satellite communications, strategic air transport, and cyber defence. However, ideas about joint EU armed forces are not new, and according to Jan Techau it has been the second oldest discussion subject next to federalism since the midth century. Yet, a European army is more of a symbol of increased integrated military capabilities and a defence industry shared by 28 nations that cannot afford to develop new technologies and provide man-power for fulfilling the full spectrum of crisis management tasks on their own.
In this regard, instead of an army the EU needs greater defence and security autonomy. This in turn, can be ensured by greater and smarter national defence spending, development of multinational The majority of nations share both organizations, which have one set of capabilities, and the Alliance and the US equally need the EU, while the Ukraine crisis has only deepened such a necessity. United We Stand, Divided We Fall One of, if not the largest reason why CSDP has not experienced deeper EU integration and further development, hides in a two-fold explanation: defence is still regarded as a matter of national sovereignty, while any decision in this domain including launching new missions or operations has to be accepted unanimously by all 28 Members.
This means that a single veto can ruin even the greatest proposal and ambitions for a greater EU global role. As foreign and security policy interests vary across Europe, reaching a consensus may become true pandemonium, if not impossible. Security of the continent at large is dependent on political unity among EU nations. For a long time France has been the greatest supporter of a stronger EU foreign and defence policy while opposing over-reliance on NATO, and US assets and capabilities.
Britain, however, although supporting it politically, could not send practical aid to the US air-strikes because of Parliament refusal, while Germany became more critical about Russia and a more active Instead of pursuing a unilateral policy because of its economic strength, Germany will always Until recently, according to Josef Janning, norms and rules have dominated the use of power in German foreign policy, EU policy has prevailed over relations with the US, while relations with Russia were both economically and politically important.
However, a year after Crimea these elements may no longer be valid, and Germany is in the leading position more so because of circumstances rather than its own willingness.
Britain has argued that it supports closer defence cooperation between sovereign Member states, but opposes any supranational entity such as EU-owned and operated headquarters, common capabilities, and EU armed forces. Therefore, if European leverage and power continues to diminish before a rapidly worsening security situation in its neighbourhood in the short term , and before other emerging powers such as China and Russia in the medium and A new strategy should come before any plans on shared military or civilian capabilities, structures, or out-of-area operations.
Moreover, the world outside and inside the EU has changed. Likewise, the EU has changed by providing in a post-Lisbon setting some new structures such as the EEAS and High Representative to assert a shared policy, while not defining what As a result, the EU is overstretched to respond to every crisis after it has emerged, while the response itself may be delayed due to lengthy compromise dealings between member states.
The Ukraine crisis has brought to the surface and exposed the lack of a strategy that could unite the diverse EU toolkit of means and connect them with the ends, based in a joint threat assessments and shared foreign policy priorities. After all, a strategy is more than a document, as it has at least six different roles to play at once. Second, a strategy provides internal and external narratives. To the outside world it proves the EU is a united actor with concrete ambitions that should to be treated accordingly. Internally, a strategy would explain to EU citizens why they should support greater defence expenditure or use of force in the CSDP framework.
Fifth, paraphrasing former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, a strategy could serve as a new software of tasks for the EU after its hardware had been changed by the Lisbon Treaty. Following Mogherini, it should also cover other aspects of CFSP, while the process of strategic review should involve a wider foreign affairs community.
However, taking a step back, above all the EU in the first place needs a strategy. Moreover, the EU should be flexible and resilient by synchronizing and tailoring its policy in line with its partners, especially but not only the US and NATO. So far it has lagged behind. For example, NATO has already adapted twice in the last five years: first, by adopting the new Strategic Concept , and a second time at the Wales Summit The Strategic Concept defined priorities for the 21st century: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.
The US has also transformed over time by adopting three different national security strategies over last 13 years: in , , and lastly in February Each time has followed a significant turn in US policy. Figure 3. Comparison of appearance times in the US National Security Strategy 97 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 In March , US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power reminded listeners that the European share of participation in UN-led peacekeeping efforts had fallen from 40 to 7 percent over the last 20 years, therefore calling for greater involvement from the EU.
Lastly, the EU could start engaging the pivotal states it has left out of its foreign policy clout for a decade or more, in particular Japan and Turkey — two countries with geopolitical importance and shared interests but as yet fully unexplored cooperation potential. Although both have focused more on relations with either the US or China, they should start embracing the need for each other, in particular realising the economic and political interests in East-Asia. Russia tried to test the limits of European security, response and resilience, as well as the endurance and flexibility of the current international order.
The analysis, produced by a wide circle of foreign and security policy experts, argue in favour of the tendency for the established and emerging powers to continue changing either the rules or the playing field of the current order in , and beyond. NATO and the US proved that for now they have endured global transformations by further evolving themselves. Yet, the EU has lagged behind. Although the European response to the Ukraine crisis could be viewed as slow and responses within the CSDP framework as inadequate or ineffective, an emerging What hindered a European responsiveness?
Among others they include: lack of a shared strategy with a common assessment of threats and challenges, lack of joint assets that could strengthen NATO and European defence autonomy, lack of unity among members that is incompatible with current decision-making procedures, and lack of investment in partnerships with shared values, interests, and concerns as the EU has.
Therefore, the Ukraine crisis should be regarded not as a sudden European failure, but rather as a wake-up call for a necessity to start at last a strategic debate on EU security, defence, and strategic recalibration. For some the Ukraine crisis might be a fragment of a much broader picture of challenges that the EU and Western world are facing, while for others it could be an existentially vital security threat, meaning a number one and only priority.
The EU and Europe at large suffer from security challenges that are over interlinked. Short-term security risks have longer-term consequences, while long-term projections may affect immediate decisions in favour of or against EU engagement in particular international crisis management. The Ukraine crisis serves as proof, as it already affects the Baltic States, Poland, and other parts of Eastern Europe in complex ways.
Although NATO has carried out reassurance and deterrence measures, it is not yet the ultimate answer to the multifaceted challenges to European security the Ukraine crisis has either unearthed or deeper exacerbated. The Alliance alone cannot solve Eastern European energy dependence on Russia or sudden cyber-attacks that may affect the whole spectrum of security aspects.
Likewise, the Ukraine crisis highlighted that the EU and NATO had not been expecting, nor were prepared, to meet the challenges of hybrid warfare consisting of massive propaganda campaigns and proxy insurgent groups used in combination with conventional politico-military tools. After all, how is one perceived as a global role model and norm-setter, if actors who choose to follow its rules and norms are attacked and disintegrated by other powers disrespecting the rules in the first place?
It should serve as a comprehensive framework to unite the 28 members behind joint interests, priorities, and a shared assessment of security challenges, thus with full respect to the national sovereignty synchronizing their efforts to exercise one global policy rather than 28 separate ones. To achieve it, the strategy may have to incorporate full use of the existing instruments EU Battle Groups and the yet to be practised post-Lisbon provisions permanent structured cooperation; EU command and control HQ; joint financing in such a manner that the EU and NATO complement each other. Lastly, to strengthen its own resilience, Europe might need to join forces with like-minded and pivotal states, for example Japan and Turkey, which could include a more deepened defence and security cooperation.
References 1 2. The Financial Times, 8 March Geneva: World Economic Forum, New York: Eurasia Group, 5 January Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians? The New York Times, 30 September Autumn, , p. October Ibid, p. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, Brussels, 8 April July The Economist, 14 February Deutsche Welle, 26 February Time, 19 January Parameters, Vol. Council of the EU, Brussels, 22 July Norwich: Foreign and Common Wealth Office. Brussels, 20 December Ibid, pp. Robert M. Andrew Higgins, David E. The Economist, 21 March Schumpeter was right.
In more concrete terms, the critic against capitalism was developed mainly inside the most developed countries, exactly where capitalism was most successful. It was not limited to Economics, but rather developed in a multidisciplinary methodological framework, thus extending the analysis to Political Science, Sociology, and International Relations. In short, the result would be Russia considering itself a victim of American and European economic interests, instrumentalized by the financial system, multilateral organizations, and diplomacy.
The West would be only interested in its natural resources, forcing the country to be in a permanent state of the Development of Underdevelopment. The promotion of democracy and human rights would be an excuse to force the country into submitting to foreign interests, mainly to tame nationalist internal politics, thus facilitating the depletion of the country by American and European companies. Although there were clear signs of deepening the Eurasian trend in Russian foreign policy, Putin also tried to develop friendly ties with the West, especially with the United States.
Soon he understood the relationship would not be smooth. Without options, Russia was forced to close it. Russia is convinced the terms of its foreign debt restructuring were especially designed to weaken its economic power, thus its military power. Shutting down the military naval base of Cam Ranh, Vietnam, because of lacking resources to pay the lease is one example. It follows that Russia should be prepared for three possible military conflict scenarios.
Second, a regional—border conflict scenario, i. Third, an internal military conflict as a result of terrorism. It is not to believe that direct military conflict with NATO in the short term is to be expected. However, Russia has been facing severe pressure with the infringement of its strategic national interests. The monetarist economic ideology imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other multilateral organizations, not only had the objective to weaken Russian society overall, but resulted in underfunding the Armed Forces, thus in operational degradation.
As a result, the view that Russia constantly faces threats from the outside became mainstream. In the face of these threats, Russia considers itself a fragile country. Putin and those in his inner circle understand that its economy is too dependent on oil and gas. As a result, there is not enough energy for expansion. At the same time, it is necessary to maintain its regional influence by all means. This explains why Russia is engaged in not letting Ukraine be closer to the West. Russia has tried to present itself as a serious global player. In this sense, the Georgian war of , from a psychological perspective, served as a way to reassure the Russian internal public.
It also reflects a clash of worldviews. On the one hand, the West tries to impose its model, one that is flawed. For example, On the other, Putin considers international development as a comprehensive process, with no place for values-based politics, but particular interests in concrete cases. Thus, any attempt to make Russia more transparent, democratic, or tolerant, is considered not only a personal attack against him and his allies, but against basic Russian values.
Therefore, the First Generation of Modern War — was marked by line and column tactics, and battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The second generation surged as a development to address contradictions between military culture and the disorderliness of the battlefield. Its objective was attrition in a way that centrallycontrolled firepower in synchrony with the infantry: the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.
The Third Generation was a development of the second, and is commonly known as the Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare. Finally, the Fourth Generation represents a return of cultures being in conflict. The state loses the monopoly of violence and war, and finds itself fighting non-state adversaries. The Kremlin gambles with the idea that old alliances like the European Union and NATO are less valuable than the economic interests it has with Western companies. Besides, many Western countries welcome obscure financial flows from the post-Soviet space as part of their own mode of economic regulation.
Therefore, the Kremlin bets these interconnections means Russia can get away with aggression. NATO itself has adopted the term. The author developed the idea that a hybrid strategy is based on tactically employing a mix of instruments, resulting in it being difficult to fully understand and establish a proper strategy to The main challenge results from state and non-state actors employing technologies and strategies that are more appropriate for their own field, in a multimode confrontation.
It may include exploiting modern capabilities to support insurgent, terrorist, and criminal activities, the use of high-tech military capabilities, combined with terrorist actions and cyber warfare operations against economic and financial targets. There are two problems. First, it still presupposes the application of kinetic force.
Russian New Generation Warfare does not. Second, it is a conceptual mistake to try to fit Russian New Generation Warfare, the result of a long military academic discussion, on Western concepts. Naturally, the word hybrid is catchy, since it may represent a mix of anything. However, due to it being a military concept and the result of American military thought, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians. Therefore, it is a methodological mistake to try to frame a theory developed independently by the Russian military on a theory developed in another country, therefore reflecting another cultures way of thinking, and strategic understanding about the way to conduct warfare.
First, doctrinal unilateralism, or the idea that the successful use of force results in legitimacy. The weak reaction of the United States and the European Union has indicated that strategy is correct. Second, by strongly adhering to legalism. For example, without discussing the legal merit of Russian actions in Ukraine, they were all backed by some form of legal act. Putin asked the Russian parliament for authorization to use military power in the Ukraine if necessary. Naturally, it was granted. Russia uses this fact together with the argument that it never used military power in Crimea as a sign of its peaceful intentions.
Third, Russia denies the idea of it having militarily occupied Crimea, since the troops there were local self-defense forces. In addition, although it is true the number of troops stationed there increased, this is still within the limits of the bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine. It argues this is a case of self-determination similar to Kosovo.
The West considers the referendum to be illegitimate, first, because it violates the constitution of the Ukraine; second, because it was organized in such haste there was no option in the ballot paper for voting for Crimea to remain part of the Ukraine. The Crimean campaign has been an impressive demonstration of strategic communication, one which shares many similarities with their intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in , while at the same time being essentially different, Its success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all their bases had surrendered.
In addition, the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR armored personal carrier. It is interesting to note the notion of permanent war, since it denotes a permanent enemy. In current geopolitical structure, the clear enemy is Western civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology.
All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage. Armed with this information they knew what to do, when and what the outcomes were likely to be, demonstrating the ancient Soviet art of reflexive control is alive and well in the Kremlin. The invisible military occupation cannot be considered an occupation by definition.
Deception operations occurred inside Russian territory as military exercises, including ones in Kaliningrad to increase the insecurity of the Baltic States and Poland. Asymmetry and Russian New Generation Warfare An often ignored aspect of Russian military art is the idea of asymmetry in warfare. This means a direct attack In the first case, it means to disarm and destroy the enemy.
In the second, it means to wear down the enemy by a process of gradual exhaustion of capabilities, equipment, number of troops, and moral resistance. One of the best example is the Vietnam War. The Vietcong were able to resist American forces long enough, until they retracted and the war was over. Hence, since the Vietcong achieved their political objectives, even without directly defeating American forces they won the war. Mao viewed guerrilla and conventional forces as part of the same mechanism for defeating the enemy.
However, the most valuable lesson the Russians learned from the Chinese regards the ideological aspect of warfare. This was very well exemplified during the Sino—Japanese War. Since the ideological dimension of war is fundamental for victory, especially during stabilization operations, to win the hearts and minds of the population is decisive. Mao had a clear advantage, since he had a clear ideology to offer, while the Japanese had not.
The idea is that support for strategic objectives of war by society in a country at war, in other words, the legitimization of war, is fundamental for achieving victory. Therefore, as a result of the specifics of fighting weaker adversaries, the following strategy was predominant: employment of small, specially trained troops; preventive actions against irregular forces; propaganda among local populations the weaker adversary pretended to defend; military and material support given to support groups in the country being attacked; a scaling-back of combat operations and employing non-military methods to pressure the opponent.
They have formalized nine points that, although allegedly could be used by the West against Russia, in reality strongly reflects the Russian asymmetric strategy operationalized in Ukraine. In the field, the discussion above means employing high-precision non-nuclear weapons, together with the support of subversive and reconnaissance groups. The strategic targets are those that, if destroyed, result as unacceptable damage to the country being attacked. They include top government administration and military control systems, major manufacturing plants, fuel and energy facilities, transportation hubs and facilities railroad hubs, bridges, ports, airports, tunnels, etc , potentially dangerous objects hydroelectric power dams and hydroelectric power complexes, processing units of chemical plants, nuclear power facilities, storages of strong poisons, etc.
Conclusion The nine points above, together with the ten strategic points of asymmetric campaigns and the eight phases discussed before, are the key elements of Russian New Generation Warfare. Since Russians understand they are not strong enough to win a war against NATO, their strategy is very much relying on asymmetric methods. As a result, each campaign is unique. Many Russian military authors stress that it has a very significant role in disorganizing military control, the state administration, and air defense system.
In Europe, the Russian strategy has focused on stimulating the lack of convergence towards common security interests by political means. According to Mark Galeotti, this includes single-issue lobbies with divisive messages, well-funded fringe parties, Russia Today, think tanks, and business lobbies, just to cite a few. Therefore, the objective is not necessarily to gain direct support for Russia. In other words, Russia uses democratic tools to fight against democracy itself. The only way to deal with this sort of warfare is with more democracy. This means more neutral information, analysis, and education.
Politicians need to be more honest, transparent, and connected with common people. Economic policy should also take the interests of the population, and should not be merely designed to support the interests of the banking sector. Unfortunately, even in Europe it seems to be quite a difficult task sometimes. Some argue the Baltic region is the most important soft spot for European security. It is not. From a defense perspective, mismanagement of the European economy in the name of specific economic ideologies and interests of the financial system is the most serious threat for European security.
It jeopardizes the legitimacy of the state, and of the European Union as democratic institution, as a direct result of rising unemployment combined with low social security. A concrete indicator of this trend, for example, is the significant rise of euro-skepticism. Also, the increase in popularity of nationalist and populist political parties with radical platforms. However, the pure military aspect cannot be ignored.
European countries have been forced to drastically cut their defense budgets as a result of bailing out the financial system. In , it dropped by 3. In the United Kingdom, the bailout for the banking sector was equivalent to 21 years of the British defense budget, which is equivalent to the annual cost of servicing the public debt.
The United States defense budget is also being considerably cut because of sequestration. At the same time, Russia has been investing hugely in modernizing its Armed Forces and soon might be more militarily powerful than Europe without the US. It is vital to remember that Russia has not only been modernizing but developing its military capabilities in the Arctic at a very rapid pace. Therefore, the Russian threat for Europe may come also from the North. Some European officials had the idea of establishing or, rather, increasing the capacity of EU Armed Forces.
However, since without money this is not possible, its operational future is obscure as countries are already struggling with their own defense budgets. The answer is probably yes. Besides pragmatically addressing its problem of legitimacy and other soft points, it would much better if the EU assumed the role of assessing and coordinating a realistic valuation of resources, interoperability, reconciling ambitions and capabilities, while at the same time providing budgetary and procurement guidance.
Finally, the EU needs to find a way to address the problem of convergence, trying to establish a common understanding about what the main threats are for European security. Bazhanov E. Nagornyi A. Dubovitsky, N. Pomerantsev P. Vladmirov, A. Hoffman, F. Joint Forces Quarterly, no. Gerasimov, V. Putin, V. Krasnaya zvezda, No. Clausewitz, K. Tzu, S. Yamaguchi, N. Nagorny A.
OSCE Debates Future of European Security | CSCE
Today the entire post-Cold War security structure of Europe has been destroyed… we can say that the former inner sense of security has been disrupted… Questions are being asked in our newspapers and in our homes that we have not heard since the restoration of our independence… A war is underway in Ukraine. People are being killed there every day. Even now. This is a new type of war, in which one clearly proven combatant is openly using the newest weapons while denying everything. It talks about the blurring of lines between states of war and peace, and how a thriving state can, in a matter of months or even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.
Recently senior NATO political and military figures have specifically drawn attention to the Baltic States as a region under particular threat. It is the aim of this essay to examine how serious the threat is to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and what should be done to guard against it. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent the opinion of any government authority or ministry.
Phase 2: Special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions. Phase 3: Intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties. Phase 4: Destabilising propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.
Phase 5: Establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units. Phase 6: Commencement of military action, immediately preceded by largescale reconnaissance and subversive missions. Phase 7: Combination of targeted information operations, electronic warfare operations, aerospace operations, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons.
Phase 8: Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units. In order to identify the degree of threat to the Baltics, it is useful to see how well this hybrid warfare has worked in Ukraine. This is based on incremental steps. Of course, without Ukraine both of these constructions are lame. It has never accepted it as permanent. Russian officials talk about it as a state and as a territory but not as a country. If one part of the nation, with the determination of Maidan, can drive out its corrupt autocrat — then this is a clear and present danger to Putin himself.
In the case of Crimea it is immediately clear that Phases 1—4, with elements of Phase 5 of new generation warfare, were seen. Together with meticulous staff planning and military discipline of the highest order this resulted in a complete Russian success, virtually without a shot being fired. This is in stark contrasts to the ramshackle military execution of the war against Georgia in There, though Military reform has apparently made great progress in the intervening six years. Spurred on by the Crimean success, the Russian leadership then embarked on the Donbas adventure. However, despite the employment of elements of all the first 7 Phases of non-linear war, a bloody stalemate has now emerged in Eastern Ukraine.
This can hardly be viewed as a success. Increasingly Russian military formations have to be brought to bear against Ukrainian forces in order to demonstrate there can be no purely military solution to the crisis, at least not for Ukraine. More to the point, the main aim of non-linear warfare is the achievement of a desired political solution. Though the political aim in Georgia may have been just to create two frozen conflict zones, the probable desired political outcome of regime change in Tbilisi was not achieved.
This came about later by way of a democratic and non-violent process. Again, the Donbas project has not yet led to the fall of the post-Maidan political system, a likely desired political outcome. Furthermore, securing another frozen conflict in the region does not further the main objective of a pliant Ukraine which prefers membership of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union to partnership with the decadent West.
This now seems a generation away. In other words, Russia does not have any good outcomes in Eastern Ukraine. Further military pressure on Ukraine could open a land bridge to Crimea but at the likely cost of more Western sanctions and an undeniable use of Russian troops. Of course this can be portrayed as a victory and would continue to undermine the Kyiv authorities, but it is surely not what Putin had in mind as the final outcome.
At the same time, Crimea has proved to be an economic disaster for Russia. Western sanctions against Crimea have also played their important part. Yet sanctions against Russia have begun to bite in recent months. This is likely to lead to increased pressure, real or perceived, on the Kremlin from those close to power who have been directly affected by the economic downturn or the many urban Russians who have got used to a better standard of living since Putin first came to power.
As Mark Galeotti has pointed out, contemporary Russians are not the Stalingrad generation. More recently, the EU has become an equally important threat because it offers an alternative, more attractive, model to the internal political structure of Russia. Russia does not expect the Baltics suddenly to have a change of heart and vote for the Eurasian Union. Such a defeat is conceivable if Article 5 of the Washington Treaty were shown to be ineffective. This is only possible in the Baltics where NATO is reluctant to station troops permanently, and where Russia has at its disposal overwhelming conventional forces.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin has been prepared to allow the Baltic States to integrate into Western structures largely because there is little risk of contamination for Russia herself: the Balts less their Russian-speaking minorities are not brother Slavs but are seen to be quite different. Even so, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have already experienced elements of Phases 1, 3 and 4 of this hybrid warfare for a number of years. Indeed, that is the reason why Baltic politicians, journalists, and commentators had so long been regarded in the West as Russophobes.
Russia has systematically used political, economic and military pressure on the Baltic States in an attempt to make their politics more amenable to Russian foreign policy goals. A combination of soft, economic and hard power have been used with varying degrees of success. Though President Putin wrote about it in , Russia Looking at the above components of soft power it must be acknowledged that Russian culture with its unique characteristics and depth of emotion is attractive to all but the least sensitive.
On the other hand, the Russian political system and Russian foreign policy, even before , were hardly values that most other countries craved to emulate. Appeals to the common heritage of Russian compatriots outside Russia, the use of Russian media and language, the popularisation of Russian culture, history, and sport have all played a role. Simultaneously the West is derided as weak, corrupt, degenerate, and postChristian. Yes, Russia may be imperfect, RT points out, but the West is just as bad insisting on double standards, and demanding from Russia standards to which it does not itself comply.
We will return to information challenges later. In terms of economic leverage, Russia has shown over many years its readiness to use its position as a key energy supplier to much of Europe for political purposes. Energy dependency provides a very powerful tool which can be used to divide and rule through pricing policies but always with the unstated threat of energy denial. But economic leverage goes much further than this: corrupt practices are an everyday reality in Russian business. Corruption is encouraged by the use of bribes and inducements as well as threats and intimidation.
For foreign businessmen seeking to work in Russia this can mean accepting local methods or even importing them back into their home country. It is made clear that business in Economic pressure is easily applied through disputes about import and other standards or simply by slowing or closing cross-border traffic. The Baltic economies are geographically linked to Russia and are therefore vulnerable. When these corrupt ties migrate to the domestic political arena, real dangers arise. After Crimea and Donbas, writing about Russian hard power is simpler.
But it is worth remembering that it has always played an important role in Soviet and Russian life, in fact it was a natural part of the thought process. Then there is the massive Russian rearmament programme to which the West should have paid more attention. It is hugely expensive, plain to see and does not correspond to any obvious threat. Cyber-attacks on Estonia in sounded a warning.
Even more clearly, in the words of Ron Asmus, the war with Georgia in should have shaken the world. Then came the crisis in Ukraine for which the West found itself totally unprepared. Are the Baltics Really Threatened? To answer this question, it is useful first to consider geography. The Baltic States are a thin sliver of under-populated land with a combined border with the Russia Federation including Kaliningrad and Belarus of more than km.
In military terms they appear to be militarily indefensible, and this was a strong argument used against them becoming members of NATO before However, it is worth noting that at the end of the Second World War, in May , the Germans still held the Courland Peninsula in Latvia against Soviet forces, even after Berlin had fallen. In other words, military defence is feasible but only with the extensive employment of troops to balance potential Russian massive local superiority.
Yet it is difficult to envision the Baltic States becoming a huge armed camp. Today land access to Kaliningrad is only possible via Belarus through Lithuanian or Polish territory. In accordance with the Gerasimov Doctrine, the Baltic States face a number of current threats. We have already looked at the political and economic pressure which has now been supplemented by an intensified level of information warfare. The methods used are multiple but the messages are that the Baltics are failed states with incompetent, corrupt governments; that they discriminate against their minorities; and that they are returning to fascism.
These messages are used internally and internationally to bring political pressure to bear on them with the constant Russian chorus that the Baltic States fail to live up to international norms and their obligations, therefore they are not worth defending. This is a powerful message and an attractive one for Europeans who do not want to envisage a return to war. Another important element of hybrid warfare is the use of Russian compatriots as a means to destabilise a target country.
This is very fertile ground, especially in Latvia and Estonia, following the deliberate Russification of these countries especially during the s and s. The Russian and Russian-speaking ethnic minorities are indeed a cause of friction. In Latvia the former are 26 percent and the latter 34 percent of the total population, according to the Latvian Migration Service. Among these are , permanent residents who have no citizenship.
They are immigrants or descendants of immigrants from the USSR during the time of occupation, who have not made use of their right to gain citizenship. This is a large number but greatly reduced from the , in How can we accept that, due to their status as non-citizens, one in six Latvian residents and one in thirteen Estonian residents are denied their fundamental political, electoral and socioeconomic rights and the ability to freely use Russian? Unofficial statistics indicate about a third of marriages are between Latvians and non-Latvians, which shows a high degree of integration.
Military pressure has been evident with the increase in military aircraft, ships and submarines approaching Baltic airspace and maritime zones and the demonstration that Russia is indeed a regional super-power. To make sure the message is getting through, less subtle tactics are also used such as kidnapping an officer of the Estonian Security Police on the Estonian-Russian border and seizure of a Lithuanian trawler in the Barents Sea. But how seriously should we take the possibility of a conventional military attack on the Baltic States?
Well, such an attack was professionally rehearsed during Exercise Zapad If, at the same time, modern air defence systems, together with naval and air forces, were able to interdict NATO air or sea reinforcement, that would put NATO in a very difficult position. However, this would be an existential challenge to NATO and US foreign policy credibility, one the US and indeed Germany could not leave unanswered after reassurances given to the Baltics at the most senior levels.
Therefore it would be a matter of time and logistics before Baltic territorial integrity would be restored. Before the Ukraine crisis a coup-demain operation to seize the Baltics might have been presented as a fait-accompli to a stunned and paralysed NATO.