Gut, ging ich eben da hin. Nachdem ich diese abgeschlossen hatte, bekam ich eine Kommandeursverwendung. In der Armee ist es sehr interessant, eine lebendige Arbeit. Aber im Prinzip ist es interessant. Wichtig sind ihr vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit und die Unterordnung des Einzelnen unter ein gemeinsames Ziel. Der Wunsch allein ist zu wenig. Ins Fahrzeug klettern, Kabel schleppen, Telefone einrichten. Man muss unbedingt losgehen, sich nach dem Bericht alles ansehen, Details einholen, Aufgaben stellen, sich einarbeiten.
So soll sich der Dienst von Frauen "von der Idee her in Nichts unterscheiden. Ich z. Nichts dergleichen. Sie beharrt auf der Einhaltung der vorgeschriebenen Regeln. Wenn du es nicht kannst — bringen wir es bei, wenn du nicht willst — zwingen wir dich. Eine zentrale Frage in diesem Zusammenhang ist, was als diskriminierend empfunden wird. Auf welcher Grundlage? Warum darf ich es nicht? Warum kann eine Frau keine Kommandoverwendung innehaben? Deswegen, weil sie eine Frau ist? Sie soll nur eine Ingenieursverwendung einnehmen, aber warum?! Ich selektiere. Das geht alles an mir vorbei. Das Wichtigste ist, den Kern zu verstehen, was der Vorgesetzte oder sonst wer will, ob er nun flucht oder nicht.
Das ist nicht beleidigend, das ist sozusagen einfach Slang. Das ist einfach die Art der Kommunikation. Darin liegt nichts Schlimmes. Es schockiert mich nicht! Mir ist es zum Beispiel nicht passiert, weil ich schon als Offizier kam. Er muss mit Wohnraum versorgt sein, damit er sich keinen Kopf um die Familie machen muss. Und dann ist im Dienst alles in Ordnung und zu Hause ist auch alles in Ordnung. A humanities journal specialised in armed forces and military structures in post-Soviet societies.
Contents - Previous document - Next document. Abstract Since the military plays a vital role in Russian society, it is also of central importance in the process of social transformation in Russia and thus in the re-construction of gender that is going on in Russian society. Full text PDF Send by e-mail. Building Professional armed Forces , A. Foster, T. Edmunds, A. Cottey Eds. Past, Imperfect, Future Uncertain, D. Herspring Ed. Webber Ed. Fedorov, B. Nygren Eds. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries. Caiazza, Mothers and soldiers: gender, citizenship, and civil society in contemporary Russia, Routledge, Dominantnye otnosheniia sredi voennosluzhashchikh srochnoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Armii, Moskva, Salmenniemi, "Civic Activity — Feminine Activity?
Nikitin Hrsg. Vashurina, "Zhenshchina v armii", Vlast , 4, 26 April. Military Balance — , hg. Moskos u. Frank R. Wood Hg. Patricia M. Guiseppe Caforio u. Juni Downloaded am Sieca-Kozlowski, s. This move raised concerns in Russia and the West about Yeltsin's commitment to economic reform.
Another casualty of the political atmosphere was RCB chairman Paramonova, whose nomination had remained a source of controversy between the State Duma and the Government. By mid many Duma deputies raised concerns about the government's failure to meet its tax revenue targets. Revenue shortages were blamed on a number of factors, including a heavy tax burden that encourages noncompliance and an inefficient and corrupt tax collection system. A variety of tax collection reforms were proposed in the parliament and the government, but by Russian enterprises and regional authorities had established a strong pattern of noncompliance with national tax regulations, and the Federal Tax Police Service was ineffectual in apprehending violators.
In , the first year of economic reform, retail prices in Russia increased by 2, percent. A major cause of the increase was the decontrol of most prices in January , a step that prompted an average price increase of percent in that month alone. By the annual rate had declined to percent, still a very high figure. In the inflation rate had improved to percent.
Trends in annual inflation rates mask variations in monthly rates, however. In , for example, the government managed to reduce monthly rates from 21 percent in January to 4 percent in August, but rates climbed once again, to Instability in Russian monetary policy caused the variations.
After tightening the flow of money early in , the Government loosened its restrictions in response to demands for credits by agriculture, industries in the Far North, and some favored large enterprises. In the pattern was avoided more successfully by maintaining the tight monetary policy adopted early in the year and by passing a relatively stringent budget. Thus, the monthly inflation rate held virtually steady below 5 percent in the last quarter of the year.
For the first half of , the inflation rate was However, experts noted that control of inflation was aided substantially by the failure to pay wages to workers in state enterprises, a policy that kept prices low by depressing demand. An important symptom of Russian macroeconomic instability has been severe fluctuations in the exchange rate of the ruble. Prior to July , the ruble's rate was set artificially at a highly overvalued level. But rapid changes in the nominal rate the rate that does not account for inflation reflected the overall macroeconomic instability.
The most drastic example of such fluctuation was the Black Tuesday 27 percent reduction in the ruble's value. The announcement reflected strengthened fiscal and monetary policies and the buildup of reserves with which the government could defend the ruble. By the end of October , the ruble had stabilized and actually appreciated in inflation-adjusted terms. It remained stable during the first half of Another sign of currency stabilization was the announcement that effective June , the ruble would become fully convertible on a current-account basis. This meant that Russian citizens and foreigners would be able to convert rubles to other currencies for trade transactions.
The essence of economic restructuring, and a critical consideration for foreign loans and investment in Russia's economy, is the privatization program. In most respects, between and Russia kept pace with or exceeded the rate established in the original privatization program of October As deputy prime minister for economic policy, the reformist Chubais was an effective advocate of privatization during its important early stages. In privatization of small enterprises began through employee buyouts and public auctions. By the end of , more than 85 percent of Russian small enterprises and more than 82, Russian state enterprises, or about one-third of the total in existence, had been privatized.
However, voucher holders also could sell the vouchers, whose cash value varied according to the economic and political conditions in the country, or they could invest them in voucher funds. By the end of June , the voucher privatization program had completed its first phase. It succeeded in transferring ownership of 70 percent of Russia's large and medium-sized enterprises to private hands and in privatizing about 90 percent of small enterprises. By that time, 96 percent of the vouchers issued in had been used by their owners to buy shares in firms directly, invest in investment funds, or sell on the secondary markets.
According to the organizers of the voucher system, some 14, firms employing about two-thirds of the industrial labor force had moved into private hands. The next phase of the privatization program called for direct cash sales of shares in remaining state enterprises. That phase would complete the transfer of state enterprises and would add to government revenues. After that procedure met stiff opposition in the State Duma, Yeltsin implemented it by decree in July But the president's commitment to privatization soon came into question.
Polevanov stunned Russian and Western privatization advocates by suggesting renationalization of some critical enterprises. Yeltsin reacted by replacing Polevanov with Petr Mostovoy, a Chubays ally. In the ensuing eighteen months, Yeltsin made two more changes in the chairmanship position. In and , political conditions continued to hamper the privatization program, and corruption scandals tarnished the program's public image.
Distrust of the privatization process was part of an increasing public cynicism about the country's political and economic leaders, fueled by the seeming failure of Yeltsin's highly touted reform to improve the lot of the average Russian. The second phase of the privatization program went ahead with the sale of state-held shares for cash. Although the process was virtually complete by the end of the first quarter of , the Government failed to garner expected revenues. Meanwhile, Yeltsin's June bid for reelection brought a virtual halt in privatization of state enterprises during the campaign period.
In February , the Procuracy announced a full-scale investigation into privatization practices, in particular a transaction in which state banks awarded loans to state firms in return for "privatization" shares in those enterprises. This loans-for-shares type of transaction characterized the second phase of privatization; banks provided the government badly needed cash based on the collateral of enterprise shares that banks presumably would be able to sell later.
But most of the twenty-nine state enterprises originally slated to participate withdrew, and the banks that received shares appeared to have a conflict of interest based on their role in setting the rules of the bidding procedure. Other banks and commercial organizations joined the traditional opponents of privatization in attacking the loans-for-shares program, and in the Government admitted that the program had been handled badly.
As a result of corruption allegations, the State Duma formed a committee to review the privatization program. And Prime Minister Chernomyrdin requested off-budget funds to buy back shares from the banks. Part of that strategy was to shift the privatization process from Moscow to the regions. In February , a presidential decree simply granted shares in about 6, state-controlled firms to regional governments, which could auction the shares and keep the profits.
Petersburg Maritime Port. The new, postelection privatization stage also was to reduce the role of enterprise workers in shareholding. Within the first years of such ownership, most worker shares had been sold at depressed prices, devaluing all shares and cutting state profits from enterprise sales. Therefore, to reach the budget target of Despite periodic delays, the inept administration of the program's more recent phases, and allegations of favoritism and corrupt transactions in the enterprise and financial structures, in international experts judged Russia's privatization effort a qualified success.
The movement of capital assets from state to private hands has progressed without serious reversal of direction--despite periodic calls for reestablishing state control of certain assets. And the process has contributed to the creation of a new class of private entrepreneur. As of mid, four and one-half years after the launching of Russia's post-Soviet economic reform, experts found the results promising but mixed.
The Russian economy has passed through a long and wrenching depression. Official Russian economic statistics indicate that from to the end of , Russian GDP declined by roughly 50 percent, far greater than the decline that the United States experienced during the Great Depression. However, alternative estimates by Western analysts described a much less severe decline, taking into account the upward bias of Soviet-era economic data and the downward bias of post-Soviet data.
Such a decline, however, was to be expected in an economy going through the transition from central planning to a market structure. Much of the decline in production has occurred in the military-industrial complex and other heavy industries that benefited most from the skewed economic priorities of Soviet planners but have much less robust demand in a free market. But other major sectors such as agriculture, energy, and light industry also suffered from the transition. To enable these sectors to function in a market system, inefficient enterprises had to be closed and workers laid off, with resulting short-term declines in output and consumption.
Analysts had expected that Russia's GDP would begin to rise in , but data for the first six months of the year showed a continuing decline, and some Russian experts predicted a new phase of economic crisis in the second half of the year. The pain of the restructuring has been assuaged somewhat by the emergence of a new private sector. Western experts believe that Russian data overstate the dimensions of Russia's economic collapse by failing to reflect a large portion of the country's private-sector activity. The Russian services sector, especially retail sales, is playing an increasingly vital role in the economy, accounting for nearly half of GDP in The services sector's activities have not been adequately measured.
Data on sector performance are skewed by the underreporting or nonreporting of output that Russia's tax laws encourage. According to Western analysts, by the end of more than half of GDP and more than 60 percent of the labor force were based in the private sector. An important but unconventional service in Russia's economy is "shuttle trading"--the transport and sale of consumer goods by individual entrepreneurs, of whom 5 to 10 million were estimated to be active in Traders buy goods in foreign countries such as China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates and in Russian cities, then sell them on the domestic market where demand is highest.
Shuttle traders have been vital in maintaining the standard of living of Russians who cannot afford consumer goods on the conventional market. However, domestic industries such as textiles suffer from this infusion of competing merchandise, whose movement is unmonitored, untaxed, and often mafia -controlled. The geographical distribution of Russia's wealth has been skewed at least as severely as it was in Soviet times.
By the mids, economic power was being concentrated in Moscow at an even faster rate than the federal government was losing political power in the rest of the country. Unfortunately, organized crime also has played a strong role in the growth of the city.
Tschetschenien - Tschetschene mit Gewehr
Opposed by a weak police force, Moscow's rate of protection rackets, contract murders, kickbacks, and bribes--all intimately connected with the economic infrastructure--has remained among the highest in Russia. In Yeltsin gave Luzhkov full control over all state property in Moscow. Under Luzhkov's leadership, the city government also acquired full or major interests in a wide variety of enterprises--from banking, hotels, and construction to bakeries and beauty salons. Such ownership has allowed Luzhkov's planners to manipulate resources efficiently and with little or no competition.
Meanwhile, Moscow also became the center of foreign investment in Russia, often to the exclusion of other regions. For example, the McDonald's fast-food chain, which began operations in Moscow in , enjoyed immediate success but expanded only in Moscow. The concentration of Russia's banking industry in Moscow gave the city a huge advantage in competing for foreign commercial activity. In mid the national government appeared to have achieved some degree of macroeconomic stability.
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However, longer-term stability depends on the ability of policy makers to withstand the inflationary pressures of demands for state subsidies and easier credits for failing enterprises and other special interests. By the structure of Russian economic output had shifted far enough that it more closely resembled that of a developed market economy than the distorted Soviet central-planning model. With the decline in demand for defense industry goods, overall production has shifted from heavy industry to consumer production.
However, in the mids the low quality of most domestically produced consumer goods continued to limit enterprises' profits and therefore their ability to modernize production operations. On the other side of the "vicious circle," reliance on an outmoded production system guaranteed that product quality would remain low and uncompetitive. Most prices are left to the market, although local and regional governments control the prices of some staples. Energy prices remain controlled, but the Government has been shifting these prices upward to close the gap with world market prices.
In hindsight, prominent Sovietologist Marshall Goldman has argued that Yeltsin should have extended property ownership to land, facilitated the formation of new companies, reformed the currency, liberalized prices, scrapped taxes on wages, brought fiscal policy under control, and moved toward convertibility of the ruble before implementing the process of privatization.
Marshall Goldman, Joseph Stiglitz the winner of the Nobel Prize in economics , and other critics of Russia's implementation of privatization generally argue that "insider buyout," which allowed state managers to usually wound up with the controlling share of the stock, further accounted for Russia's poor implementation of economic restructuring. The "insider buyout" supposedly induced 'employee dominant ownership', inevitably leading to the tendency for the stockholders, who are managers or employees themselves, to vote for increased wages, reduced investments, and fewer layoffs, which all disfavor the growth of market economy.
In Russia a far higher share of state-owned assets were sold to managers and workers, or "insiders," compared to the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. In this sense, it is more precise to describe Russia's privatization as "insider privatization" the first stage and "oligarch privatization", and thus distinct from the general pattern of privatization in other, more successful countries in Eastern Europe.
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Many have therefore argued that it would be more accurate to say that real economic reform was never tried, given that it was quickly subverted by actors outside the government's control, such as the Central Bank, ministries, regional governments, and industrial managers. Aside from the distortions associated with the lack of competition, employee ownership in general keeps wages and employment at levels that were too high.
The impact of "insider buyout" in Russia can be seen from the abnormally low unemployment rates and very high underemployment levels in privatized industries. Generally speaking, large-scale privatization of moribund, money-losing state owned enterprises should increase unemployment.
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Some Soviet industries, after all, were not even value adding, with cost of inputs exceeding the cost of outputs though it must be noted that in a planned economy this can sometimes be reasonable. Sixteen percent of the workforce became unemployed in both the former East Germany and Poland. But in Russia, in the most radical stage of privatization, , only 6. According to major surveys of Russian enterprise directions about whether they would be willing to sell a majority of the shares of their enterprise to an outside investor who would bring in the capital needed to invest in modernizing the firm, two-thirds said they would not be willing.
In other words, they would rather remain majority owners of an unprofitable enterprise than minority owners of a much more profitable one. Very few firms have experienced much management turnover. According to Stiglitz, the key economic mistakes of the transition were the emphasis on privatization over competition and the emphasis on restructuring existing enterprises over creation of new jobs and enterprises. With emphasis on just transferring ownership to private hands in order to create a lobby for private enterprise in order to prevent a communist comeback and push for creation of institutions to govern the market instead of competition, price controls were lifted without dismantling key Soviet-era monopolies.
Prices thus were not able to properly equilibrate according to levels dictated by supply and demand since private profit-seeking monopolies lacked the incentives provided by competition to lower prices. According to the "Washington Consensus", privatization would lead to incentives to improve productivity of Soviet-era state enterprises.
However, privatized enterprises would be difficult to revitalize, given the high interest rates and lack of financial institutions to provide capital. With inflation at double-digit rates per month as a result of instantaneous price liberalization, the macroeconomic stabilization program enacted to curb this trend entailed the tightening the money supply and raising interest rates.
During the early s the focus on macrostabilization led to interest rates of 20, 30, 40, percent. With interest rates so high, "non-insiders" were left largely incapable of borrowing the capital to invest in Russian enterprises, a major factor leaving privatized industries starved of cash. In addition, shock therapy had wiped out the savings of most Russians, leaving ordinary Russians largely incapable of investing in enterprises left up for auction. Until around , due partly to the lack of competition, many enterprises did not have enough working capital to pay the wages and taxes on time, and traded with one another using barter.
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Not able to pay wages, upgrading and modernizing their facilities was out of the question. The high interest rates and shortage of financial capital forced some industries to barter, leading to a new system of distorted prices barter creates unreal values. By , at least half of enterprise output was being "sold" through barter or trade. The federal government has effectively allowed them to avoid paying much of their federal taxes in return for keeping key customers, such as military bases and major industrial enterprises, supplied with energy and power. Existing institutions were abandoned before the legal structures of a market economy that govern private property, oversee the financial market, and enforce taxation were functional.
Yet, the two major components of a macroeconomy are banking system and the state budgetary system. Complicated markets require strong contract enforcement, accepted customs and practices, and financial and regulatory institutions account for the bulk of economic output. Instead, Russia was left with Soviet-era institutions with organization. Privatized enterprises would thus be difficult to revitalize, given the lack of financial institutions to provide capital. Several devastating blows were dealt to the potential capital market.
Second, a large number of financial pyramids extracted huge amounts of money from unsuspecting public. Third, the government has successfully repeated the scheme with their short-term government obligations, extracting tens of billions of dollars from unsuspecting investors and then defaulting on domestic obligations. As a result, the Russian stock market remains almost irrelevant. According to Stiglitz, "Anyone smart enough to be a winner in the privatization sweepstakes would be smart enough to put their money in the booming U. It was not even a close call; and not surprisingly, billions poured out of the country.
Among other things destroyed during the transition to market economy were Soviet educational and science systems. Teachers and scientists, together with doctors, were the hardest hit by the transition. As the government was unwilling to index fixed salaries according to inflation or even to make salary payments on time, education and science incomes quickly dropped below the level of subsistence, ridding the schools, universities and research institutes of qualified specialists in record time.
Some scientists fled to the West, attracting some attention to the problem of "brain drain," but nothing was done. As of , more than half of the school graduates were functionally illiterate, professional and higher education were nigh unto useless and the amount of fundamental and applied research was minuscule, compared with the Soviet potential. Russia posted gross domestic product growth of 8. This is still higher than most of the other countries. By the end of , Russia had achieved some progress. Inflation had been brought under control, the ruble was stabilized, and an ambitious privatization program had transferred thousands of enterprises to private ownership.
Some important market-oriented laws had also been passed, including a commercial code governing business relations and the establishment of an arbitration court for resolving economic disputes. But in , the Asian financial crisis swept through the country, contributing to a sharp decline in Russia's earnings from oil exports and resulting in an exodus of foreign investors. In , output increased for only the second time since , by an officially estimated 3. This increase was achieved despite a year of potential turmoil that included the tenure of three premiers and culminated in the New Year's Eve resignation of President Boris Yeltsin.
Many investors, both domestic and international remain on the sidelines, scared off by Russia's long-standing problems with capital flight, reliance on barter transactions, widespread corruption among officials, and endemic organized crime. The Russian economy underwent tremendous stress as it moved from a centrally planned economy to a free market system. Difficulties in implementing fiscal reforms aimed at raising government revenues and a dependence on short-term borrowing to finance budget deficits led to a serious financial crisis in Lower prices for Russia's major export earners oil and minerals and a loss of investor confidence due to the Asian financial crisis exacerbated financial problems.
The result was a rapid decline in the value of the ruble, flight of foreign investment, delayed payments on sovereign and private debts, a breakdown of commercial transactions through the banking system, and the threat of runaway inflation. Russia, however, appears to have weathered the crisis relatively well. Real GDP increased by the highest percentage since the fall of the Soviet Union, the ruble stabilized, inflation was moderate, and investment began to increase again.
Russia is making progress in meeting its foreign debts obligations. During , Russia not only met its external debt services but also made large advance repayments of principal on IMF loans but also built up Central Bank reserves with government budget, trade, and current account surpluses. Large current account surpluses have brought a rapid appreciation of the ruble over the past several years. Oil and gas dominate Russian exports, so Russia remains highly dependent upon the price of energy. Loan and deposit rates at or below the inflation rate inhibit the growth of the banking system and make the allocation of capital and risk much less efficient than it would be otherwise.
In the June G8 Summit, leaders of the eight nations signed a statement agreeing to explore cancellation of some of Russia's old Soviet debt to use the savings for safeguarding materials in Russia that could be used by terrorists. Continued low inflation and strict government budget led to the growth, while lower oil prices and ruble appreciation slowed it.
At the end of , the unemployment rate was 9. Combined unemployment and underemployment may exceed those figures. Industrial output in grew by 4.
The contribution of fixed capital investment, an important contributor to growth in , lost its importance in industrial growth. The exchange rate stabilized in ; after falling from 6. As of June , the exchange rate was After some large spikes in inflation following the August economic crisis, inflation has declined steadily.
Cumulative consumer price inflation for was The Central Bank's accumulation of foreign reserves drove inflation higher and that trend is expected to continue. Central and local government expenditures are about equal. Fiscal policy has been very disciplined since the debt crisis. The overall budget surplus for was 2. Much of this growth, which exceeded most expectations for the third consecutive year, was driven by consumption demand.
Analysts remain skeptical that high rates of economic growth will continue, particularly since Russia's planned budgets through assume that oil prices will steadily increase. Low oil prices would mean that the Russian economy would not achieve its projected growth. However, high oil prices also would have negative economic effects, as they would cause the ruble to continue to appreciate and make Russian exports less competitive. Lack of legislation and, where there is legislation, lack of effective law enforcement, in many areas of economic activity is a pressing issue.
During and , changes in government administration increased the power of the central government to compel localities to enforce laws. Progress has been made on pension reform and reform of the electricity sector. Nonetheless, taxation and business regulations are unpredictable, and legal enforcement of private business agreements is weak.
Attitudes left over from the Soviet period will take many years to overcome. Government decisions affecting business have often been arbitrary and inconsistent. Crime has increased costs for both local and foreign businesses. On the positive side, Russian businesses are increasingly turning to the courts to resolve disputes.
The passage of an improved bankruptcy code in January was one of the first steps. In , the Duma passed legislation for positive changes within the business and investment sector; the most critical legislation was a deregulation package. This trend in legislation is continued through , with the new corporate tax code going into. The mineral-packed Ural Mountains and the vast oil, gas, coal, and timber reserves of Siberia and the Russian Far East make Russia rich in natural resources. However, most such resources are located in remote and climatically unfavorable areas that are difficult to develop and far from Russian ports.
Oil and gas exports continue to be the main source of hard currency, but declining energy prices have hit Russia hard. Russia is a leading producer and exporter of minerals, gold, and all major fuels. The Russian fishing industry is the world's fourth-largest, behind Japan, the United States, and China.
Russia accounts for one-quarter of the world's production of fresh and frozen fish and about one-third of world output of canned fish. Natural resources, especially energy, dominate Russian exports. Ninety percent of Russian exports to the United States are minerals or other raw materials. Russia is one of the most industrialized of the former Soviet republics. However, years of very low investment have left much of Russian industry antiquated and highly inefficient. Besides its resource-based industries, it has developed large manufacturing capacities, notably in machinery.
Russia inherited most of the defense industrial base of the Soviet Union, so armaments are the single-largest manufactured goods export category for Russia. Efforts have been made with varying success over the past few years to convert defense industries to civilian use. Russia comprises roughly three-quarters of the territory of the former Soviet Union but has relatively little area suited for agriculture because of its arid climate and inconsistent rainfall.
Northern areas concentrate mainly on livestock, and the southern parts and western Siberia produce grain. Restructuring of former state farms has been an extremely slow process. The new land code passed by the Duma in should speed restructuring and attract new domestic investment to Russian agriculture. Foreigners are not allowed to own farmland in Russia. Private farms and garden plots of individuals account for over one-half of all agricultural production.
In , investment increased by 4. Higher retained earnings, increased cash transactions, the positive outlook for sales, and political stability have contributed to these favorable trends. Foreign investment in Russia is very low. Cumulative investment from U. Over the medium-to-long term, Russian companies that do not invest to increase their competitiveness will find it harder either to expand exports or protect their recent domestic market gains from higher quality imports.
Foreign portfolio investment, which includes shares and securities, decreased dramatically in , but has experienced significant growth since then. During the years of recovery following the debt crisis, capital flight seems to have slowed. Inward investment from Cyprus and Gibraltar, two important channels for capital flight from Russia in recent years, suggest that some Russian money is returning home. A significant drawback for investment is the banking sector, which lacks the resources, the capability, and the trust of the population that it would need to attract substantial savings and direct it toward productive investments.
Interest on deposits and loans are often below the inflation rate. The poorly developed banking system makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to raise capital and to diversify risk. Banks still perceive commercial lending as risky, and some banks are inexperienced with assessing credit risk.
It also is the only Russian bank that has a federal deposit insurance guarantee. Under his leadership, necessary banking reforms, including stricter accounting procedures and federal deposit insurance, are likely to be implemented. In , exports were up slightly, while imports slumped by In , the trend shifted, as exports declined while imports increased. Ferrous metals exports suffered the most in , declining 7. Most analysts predict these trade trends will continue to some extent in Frequent and unpredictable changes in customs regulations also have created problems for foreign and domestic traders and investors.
In March , Russia placed a ban on poultry from the United States. Trade with CIS countries is up Trade with the EU forms The mafia remains a significant force in Russia.